

SoK: Namespace and Public Key Management in NDN

Pouyan Fotouhi Tehrani¹, Eric Osterweil²,
Thomas C. Schmidt³, Matthias Wählisch⁴

¹Weizenbaum Institut / Fraunhofer FOKUS ²George Mason University ³Hamburg University of Applied Sciences ⁴Freie Universität Berlin

ACM ICN 2022, September 19-21, 2022 – Osaka, Japan



weizenbaum
institut



Information Centric Networking the next generation Internet.

A brief and inaccurate history.

Commercialization
of the Internet



1994



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“WE SHOULD ENABLE ALL
THE WORLD’S PEOPLE TO
EXPLORE THE FAR REACHES
OF CYBERSPACE.”



1994


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*“the primary use of
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
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


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CCN was born



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

2006



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"WE SHOULD ENABLE ALL
THE WORLD'S PEOPLE TO

Are we there yet? Why not?

CCN was born

Brief History of Networking

Generation 1: the phone system
(focus on the wires)

Generation 2: the Internet
(focus on the endpoints)

Generation 3? dissemination
(focus on the data)

*"the primary use of
the Internet is content
distribution."*

1994


1998

2000

2006



Named Data Networking NDN




Named Data Networking NDN

/org/ietf/alice/cv.pdf

Global Local / Application name




Data



Named Data Networking NDN

/org/ietf/alice/cv.pdf
Global Local / Application name

http://ietf.org/alice/cv.pdf
alice@ietf.org






Producer

Challenge: how can data be
securely bound to its name?




Consumer


Named Data Networking NDN




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
Named Data Networking NDN



Named Data Networking NDN



Named Data Networking NDN



Named Data Networking NDN



To establish trust, we need **namespace** and **public key** management



Status Quo ACM ICN '15 – '21

Survey of over 30 NDN applications

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Table 1: An overview of selected CCN/NDN applications and their namespace and key management requirements, based on surveying research published at ACM ICN '15–'21

	Namespace Requirements			Key Usage			
	Name	Prefix	Functional Components	Name Format ^{†‡}	Confidentiality	Authentication	Access Control
Routing and forwarding	NLSR [31]	Network name	Site and router names	/ <code><network>/<site>/<router></code>	-	Routing messages	-
	LSCR [29]	Network name	Site, router, msg type	/ <code><network>/<site>/<router>/LSCR/LSA/<typeID></code>	-	-	-
	SNAMP [5]	Global prefix	-	/ <code><network>/<site>/</code>	-	Link objects	-
	MNDN [55]	1. Global prefix 2. Name server	- DFZ prefix	/ <code><network></code> / <code><GNRS>/<DFZ-prefix></code>	-	Link objects	Zone mappings
	KITE [88]	Global prefix	Tracing segment	/ <code><network>/<traceSeg></code>	-	-	Trace interest
	LEO NDN[45]	Satellite location	-	/ <code><baseNS>/<satID></code>	-	-	-
Sync	ChronoSync [90]	1. Broadcast space 2. -	Sync interest Sync reply	/ <code><broadcast>/<appName></code> / <code><producerID>/<appName></code>	Sync data	-	Sync group
	PSync [86]	Multicast space [†]	Sync interest and reply	-	-	-	-
	MMORPG Sync [52]	Game ID	Game instance	/ <code><appID>/<gameInst></code>	-	-	-
Security	ICN-based MIS[9]	Identity	Application ID	/ <code><idPart1>/<idPart2>/<appID></code>	-	Identities	Data
	CCN-AC[43]	Anonymizer domain	Parameters	/ <code><anonDomain>/[<encName> <cmd>]</code>	Interest/Data	Anonymizer/Caches	Interest/Data
	NDN OSCP [64]	1. Query service 2. Update service	- key ID and Update commands	/ <code><ocspNS></code> / <code><server>/<keyID>/<cmd></code>	-	Services	Update service
	NDN-ABS [63]	-	ABE public params	/ <code><baseNS>/ABE/<public-params></code>	Data Packets	Producer	Consumer
Diagnostic	NCMP [49]	-	Command and params	/ <code><baseNS>/register/<cmd></code>	Result	Requester	Server
	NDN-Trace [38]	Trace prefix	Parameters	/ <code><Trace>/<pathType>/<traceType>/<name></code> / <code><server>/<Trace>/<pathType>/<traceType>/<name></code>	-	-	-

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	NDN OCSP [64]	1. Query service 2. Update service	- key ID and Update commands	<code>/<ocspNS></code> <code>/<server>/<keyID>/<cmd></code>	-	Services	Update service
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
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
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Namespace Management




Namespace Management

DNS




Public Key Management



Public Key Management

Web PKI



NDN Public Key Management NDN PKM

NDN Technical Report – 2015

`/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/KEY/0x01/0x0A`

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Identity Key ID Version

Denotes **both** Certificate owner
and the namespace it controls

Namespace Management

Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↳	Granularity:	Subspace
↳	Cardinality:	1 – n
↳	Persistence:	Transient
↳	Security:	TA Signature
↳	Delegability:	✓
Governance:		
↳	Scope:	Local
↳	Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↳	Issuance:	Namespace Principal
↳	Distribution:	Owner / cert hosts
↳	Storage:	Owner
↳	Rollover:	✗
↳	Revocation:	Owner

NDN Public Key Management NDN PKM

NDN Technical Report – 2015

`/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/KEY/0x01/0x0A`

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Identity Key ID Version

Allows binding multiple
keys to the same identity

Namespace Management

Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
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Public Key Management

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↳	Revocation:	Owner

NDN Public Key Management NDN PKM

NDN Technical Report – 2015

/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/KEY/0x01/0x0A

└──────────────────────────┘ └──┘ └──┘

Identity Key ID Version

Allows certificate renewals
and multi-signatures

Namespace Management

Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↳	Granularity:	Subspace
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Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
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↳	Distribution:	Owner / cert hosts
↳	Storage:	Owner
↳	Rollover:	✗
↳	Revocation:	Owner

NDN Public Key Management NDN PKM

NDN Technical Report – 2015

`/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/KEY/0x01/0x0A`



→ **Delegation:** Alice signs the key of delegatee,
e.g., `/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/c64`
`/KEY/<KeyID>/<Version>`

Namespace Management

Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
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Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
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↔	Distribution:	Owner / cert hosts
↔	Storage:	Owner
↔	Rollover:	✗
↔	Revocation:	Owner

NDN Public Key Management NDN PKM

NDN Technical Report – 2015

`/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/KEY/0x01/0x0A`



→ **Delegation:** Alice signs the key of delegatee,
e.g., `/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/c64`
`/KEY/<KeyID>/<Version>`

→ **Certificate revocation:** Alice publishes a
new packet signed with revoked key,
e.g., `/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/`
`/KEY/0x01/0x0A/REVOKED`

Namespace Management

Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↔	Granularity:	Subspace
↔	Cardinality:	1 – n
↔	Persistence:	Transient
↔	Security:	TA Signature
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Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↔	Issuance:	Namespace Principal
↔	Distribution:	Owner / cert hosts
↔	Storage:	Owner
↔	Rollover:	✗
↔	Revocation:	Owner

NDN Public Key Management NDN PKM

NDN Technical Report – 2015

`/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/KEY/0x01/0x0A`

Identity

Key ID Version

- **Delegation:** Alice signs the key of delegatee, e.g., `/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/c64/KEY/<KeyID>/<Version>`
- **Certificate revocation:** Alice publishes a new packet signed with revoked key, e.g., `/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/KEY/0x01/0x0A/REVOKED`
- **Signature revocation:** regular signature status, e.g., `/ndn/edu/ucla/alice/SigStatus/<HASH>/<TS>`

Namespace Management

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Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↳	Issuance:	Namespace Principal
↳	Distribution:	Owner / cert hosts
↳	Storage:	Owner
↳	Rollover:	✗
↳	Revocation:	Owner

NDN Public Key Management NDN PKM

NDN Technical Report – 2015

Challenges:


- Burden of key management is on key owner
- Compromised keys can be used to suppress certificate or signature revocations
- Cumbersome verification (minimum of 3 Additional packages to validate a single NDO)

Namespace Management		
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Public Key Management		
Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↔	Issuance:	Namespace Principal
↔	Distribution:	Owner / cert hosts
↔	Storage:	Owner
↔	Rollover:	✗
↔	Revocation:	Owner

Trust Schema

ACM ICN '15



Namespace Management


Structure:	Hierarchical
Allocation:	
↳ Granularity:	Arbitrary
↳ Cardinality:	1 - n
↳ Persistence:	Permanent
↳ Security:	TA Signature
↳ Delegability:	X
Governance:	
↳ Scope:	Local
↳ Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:	Hierarchical
Key Management:	
↳ Issuance:	Designated CA
↳ Distribution:	Owner
↳ Storage:	Owner
↳ Rollover:	X
↳ Revocation:	X

Trust Schema

ACM ICN '15



Namespace Management

Structure:	Hierarchical
Allocation:	
↳ Granularity:	Arbitrary
↳ Cardinality:	1 - n
↳ Persistence:	Permanent
↳ Security:	TA Signature
↳ Delegability:	✗
Governance:	
↳ Scope:	Local
↳ Organization:	Centralized


Public Key Management

Trust Model:	Hierarchical
Key Management:	
↳ Issuance:	Designated CA
↳ Distribution:	Owner
↳ Storage:	Owner
↳ Rollover:	✗
↳ Revocation:	✗

<org><ietf>[user]<> → <org><ietf>[user]<KEY>

Trust Schema

ACM ICN '15



Namespace Management

Structure:	Hierarchical
Allocation:	
↳ Granularity:	Arbitrary
↳ Cardinality:	1 - n
↳ Persistence:	Permanent
↳ Security:	TA Signature
↳ Delegability:	✗
Governance:	
↳ Scope:	Local
↳ Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:	Hierarchical
Key Management:	
↳ Issuance:	Designated CA
↳ Distribution:	Owner
↳ Storage:	Owner
↳ Rollover:	✗
↳ Revocation:	✗

<org><ietf>[user]<KEY> → <org><ietf><admin><KEY>
<org><ietf>[user]<KEY> → <org><ietf><ndnmaster><KEY>

Trust Schema

ACM ICN '15

Challenges:

- Key Revocation is not explicitly defined
- No a priori known authentication paths can be used for availability attacks
- No possibility of delegation
- No synchronization between data and corresponding trust schema

Namespace Management

Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↳	Granularity:	Arbitrary
↳	Cardinality:	1 – n
↳	Persistence:	Permanent
↳	Security:	TA Signature
↳	Delegability:	✘
Governance:		
↳	Scope:	Local
↳	Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↳	Issuance:	Designated CA
↳	Distribution:	Owner
↳	Storage:	Owner
↳	Rollover:	✘
↳	Revocation:	✘

NDNSSEC

ACM ICN '19

`https://ietf.org/alice/cv.pdf`

`ndn:///org/ietf/alice/cv.pdf`



Namespace Management

Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↔	Granularity:	Subspace
↔	Cardinality:	1 – n
↔	Persistence:	Transient
↔	Security:	DNSSEC PKI
↔	Delegability:	✓
Governance:		
↔	Scope:	Global
↔	Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↔	Issuance:	DNS Zone owner
↔	Distribution:	Owner / DNS
↔	Storage:	Owner
↔	Rollover:	✓
↔	Revocation:	Issuer

`https://ietf.org/alice/cv.pdf`

`ndn:///org/ietf/alice/cv.pdf`



Use DNS(SEC) for both
namespace and public
key management

Namespace Management

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↔	Security:	DNSSEC PKI
↔	Delegability:	✓
Governance:		
↔	Scope:	Global
↔	Organization:	Centralized


Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↔	Issuance:	DNS Zone owner
↔	Distribution:	Owner / DNS
↔	Storage:	Owner
↔	Rollover:	✓
↔	Revocation:	Issuer



NDNSSEC

ACM ICN '19



Namespace Management

Structure:	Hierarchical
Allocation:	
↔	Granularity: Subspace
↔	Cardinality: 1 - n
↔	Persistence: Transient
↔	Security: DNSSEC PKI
↔	Delegability: ✓
Governance:	
↔	Scope: Global
↔	Organization: Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:	Hierarchical
Key Management:	
↔	Issuance: DNS Zone owner
↔	Distribution: Owner / DNS
↔	Storage: Owner
↔	Rollover: ✓
↔	Revocation: Issuer

Challenges:

- Complex maintenance of trust chains
- Poor scalability performance (all keys are fetched and validated at once)
- Reliance on DNS transport

Namespace Management

Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↳	Granularity:	Subspace
↳	Cardinality:	1 – <i>n</i>
↳	Persistence:	Transient
↳	Security:	DNSSEC PKI
↳	Delegability:	✓
Governance:		
↳	Scope:	Global
↳	Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↳	Issuance:	DNS Zone owner
↳	Distribution:	Owner / DNS
↳	Storage:	Owner
↳	Rollover:	✓
↳	Revocation:	Issuer

Identity-based Trust

IBC: IEEE ICNP '11 / HIBC: IEEE WETICE '17



Private Key Generator

Namespace Management


Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↳	Granularity:	Subspace
↳	Cardinality:	1 – 1
↳	Persistence:	Permanent
↳	Security:	PKG Signature
↳	Delegability:	✘
Governance:		
↳	Scope:	Local
↳	Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:		Basic / Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↳	Issuance:	PKG
↳	Distribution:	NA
↳	Storage:	Owner / PKG
↳	Rollover:	✘
↳	Revocation:	✘

Identity-based Trust

IBC: IEEE ICNP '11 / HIBC: IEEE WETICE '17



Namespace Management


Structure:	Hierarchical
Allocation:	
↳ Granularity:	Subspace
↳ Cardinality:	1 – 1
↳ Persistence:	Permanent
↳ Security:	PKG Signature
↳ Delegability:	✘
Governance:	
↳ Scope:	Local
↳ Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:	Basic / Hierarchical
Key Management:	
↳ Issuance:	PKG
↳ Distribution:	NA
↳ Storage:	Owner / PKG
↳ Rollover:	✘
↳ Revocation:	✘

Identity-based Trust

IBC: IEEE ICNP '11 / HIBC: IEEE WETICE '17




Namespace Management		
Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↪	Granularity:	Subspace
↪	Cardinality:	1 – 1
↪	Persistence:	Permanent
↪	Security:	PKG Signature
↪	Delegability:	✘
Governance:		
↪	Scope:	Local
↪	Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management		
Trust Model:		Basic / Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↪	Issuance:	PKG
↪	Distribution:	NA
↪	Storage:	Owner / PKG
↪	Rollover:	✘
↪	Revocation:	✘

Identity-based Trust

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Namespace Management


Structure:	Hierarchical
Allocation:	
↳ Granularity:	Subspace
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Public Key Management

Trust Model:	Basic / Hierarchical
Key Management:	
↳ Issuance:	PKG
↳ Distribution:	NA
↳ Storage:	Owner / PKG
↳ Rollover:	✘
↳ Revocation:	✘

Identity-based Trust

IBC: IEEE ICNP '11 / HIBC: IEEE WETICE '17



Namespace Management


Structure:	Hierarchical
Allocation:	
↳ Granularity:	Subspace
↳ Cardinality:	1 – 1
↳ Persistence:	Permanent
↳ Security:	PKG Signature
↳ Delegability:	✗
Governance:	
↳ Scope:	Local
↳ Organization:	Centralized

Public Key Management

Trust Model:	Basic / Hierarchical
Key Management:	
↳ Issuance:	PKG
↳ Distribution:	NA
↳ Storage:	Owner / PKG
↳ Rollover:	✗
↳ Revocation:	✗

Identity-based Trust

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Namespace Management

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Public Key Management

Trust Model:	Basic / Hierarchical
Key Management:	
↳ Issuance:	PKG
↳ Distribution:	NA
↳ Storage:	Owner / PKG
↳ Rollover:	✗
↳ Revocation:	✗

Identity-based Trust

IBC: IEEE ICNP '11 / HIBC: IEEE WETICE '17

Challenges:

- Private keys are known to PKG (key escrow)
- Lack of namespace delegability
- Poor scalability performance
- Revoking a key equals to revoking an identity and respective data

Namespace Management		
Structure:		Hierarchical
Allocation:		
↳	Granularity:	Subspace
↳	Cardinality:	1 – 1
↳	Persistence:	Permanent
↳	Security:	PKG Signature
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Governance:		
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Public Key Management		
Trust Model:		Basic / Hierarchical
Key Management:		
↳	Issuance:	PKG
↳	Distribution:	NA
↳	Storage:	Owner / PKG
↳	Rollover:	✘
↳	Revocation:	✘

Conclusion

Namespace Management

- Application-level names are used at the network layer
- Current proposals focus on locally unique names
- Internet-wide names will consist of two parts, one that requires global and one that requires application-level management
- Security is based on custom PKIs

Public Key Management

- Bootstrapping procedures and renewal and revocation schema are open problems



Conclusion

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Question, critique, cooperation? pft@acm.org

